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25 April 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

FROM: John Helgerson
Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: Breakfast with Senator Malcolm Wallop (R., WY) and
William Geimer, President, Jamestown Foundation

1. You will host Senator Wallop and Mr. Geimer for breakfast at 0800 hours on 26 April. Bob Gates, Dick Stolz and I will join you. This breakfast is at Senator Wallop's initiative. According to Senator Wallop's staff, the principal purpose is to discuss defector resettlement issues and support for the Jamestown Foundation's work. Bob Gates has met with Mr. Geimer several times and Dick Stolz is familiar with the defector resettlement programs and issues. [REDACTED]

25X1

MR. GEIMER and DEFECTORS

2. Mr. Geimer is an attorney who established the Jamestown Foundation in 1984. The nonprofit Foundation assists "high level" East Bloc defectors who can provide insights into their former countries and governments. It provides a variety of free services, including legal aid and assistance for defectors writing books and articles. [REDACTED]

25X1

3. During 1986, Mr. Geimer was highly critical of the Agency's handling of defectors. For example, a December 1986 New York Times article quotes him as stating, "They say a guy who defects is a traitor, no matter how you look at it. And they treat them like dirt." Mr. Geimer has apparently changed his views. In 1987 Senate testimony he said, "...the CIA seems to have resolved the problems which affected its performance in the past. It has been quite some time since we have heard the type of horror story which used to be commonplace. We are inclined to give the credit for this to CIA Deputy Director Bob Gates, who has a sincere interest in the welfare of defectors." [REDACTED]

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4. You may wish to draw on the following general description of the organizational changes we made in the wake of the [REDACTED]

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25X1

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5. During the 1987 Senate hearings, Mr. Geimer made several recommendations which he may well repeat at the breakfast including:

- Endowing a federally financed fund to help high level defectors acquire educational and other credentials necessary to "...establish themselves as full members of the American academic and policy-influencing sector,"
- Reducing the waiting period for American citizenship from ten years to three years for certain highly desirable individuals,
- Informing defectors about the existence of organizations like the Jamestown Foundation and arranging a meeting with the organization early in the debriefing process,
- Using Agency authorities to support nonintelligence defectors. [REDACTED]

25X1

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TALKING POINTS

- We always welcome suggestions about how to improve our work with defectors. [REDACTED] 25X1
- Most of the defectors we work with want minimal exposure and quiet resettlement. We are well aware of the excellent work of the Jamestown Foundation and other organizations aiding defectors. We will certainly give most careful consideration to referring defectors in appropriate cases. [REDACTED] 25X1

SENATOR WALLOP AND ARMS CONTROL

6. Senator Wallop, a former Member of the Intelligence Committee, maintains an active interest in intelligence and national security issues. Although we expect the breakfast to focus on Jamestown Foundation issues, Senator Wallop is particularly active now on arms control and the INF Treaty. One of his recent Senate speeches concerning the INF Treaty is attached. In the last paragraphs he alleges that "...there has been an effort to strong-arm members of the intelligence community by high-ranking US officials to change their assessments of the number of treaty-limited items." He also cites "...the DCI's failure to provide a consensus figure on the number of SS-20's" as evidence that verification of INF has had a "perfidious effect" on the Intelligence Community. [REDACTED] 25X1

TALKING POINTS

- We may want to talk about the details of this issue at another time. [REDACTED] 25X1
- On occasion, agencies of the Intelligence Community do not agree on specific issues--that is a strength in our system, not a weakness. We can give policymakers a clear understanding of the ambiguities of evidence in a particular case. We don't bury our differences. [REDACTED] 25X1
- The SS-20 case is an important issue but not atypical. We are working with little data for reasons you know well. The analysts involved use different methodologies to make their estimates. They all do a responsible, professional job and I do not have the evidence to dismiss any of these estimates. [REDACTED] 25X1

SENATOR WALLOP AND INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT LEGISLATION

7. Senator Wallop has strongly opposed the Intelligence Oversight bill that passed the Senate last month by a margin of 71-19. He believes the bill was poorly drafted and is concerned

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that the requirement to notify the Intelligence Committees or the leadership of Congress of a covert action no later than 48 hours after Presidential approval of the Finding will make it more difficult to obtain the cooperation of other countries in implementing a covert action. Senator Wallop was also concerned about the definition of special activities contained in the bill. Senator Wallop was successful in obtaining Senate approval of two amendments to the Oversight bill. The first amendment strengthens your authority to withhold the identity of other countries assisting the Agency in carrying out a covert action. The second amendment clarifies a provision of the bill so as to permit the Agency to carry out activities in other countries that would violate U.S. law if performed in the U.S. [REDACTED]

25X1

TALKING POINTS

-- I appreciate your effort on the Senate floor to clarify my authority to protect the identity of countries assisting the Agency in carrying out covert action and to clarify the authority of the Agency to carry out activities in other countries that would violate U.S. law if performed in the U.S. [REDACTED]

25X1

-- I agree with you that the definition of special activities contained in the bill can be improved, and I understand that the House Intelligence Committee is working on a companion bill that will attempt to clarify the definition of special activities. [REDACTED]

25X1

-- Given the climate today in Congress on the issue of Congressional notification of special activities, it is likely the Administration will face the same difficulty in the House as it did in the Senate in persuading a majority of Members to accept a provision in the Intelligence Oversight bill recognizing the President's power to delay notification of a Finding beyond 48 hours. [REDACTED]

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-- I understand the President will probably veto the bill if it is presented to him with a provision requiring mandatory notice of a Finding within 48 hours. Unfortunately, the prospects do not appear bright at this moment that the veto can be sustained. (U)

25X1

[REDACTED]

John L. Helgerson

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BIOGRAPHY

Name (including party/state:) Malcolm Wallop (R., WY.)

First elected: 1976 Up for re-election: 1988 Winning%: 57

Past service on intelligence committee: Yes: X No:

Current service on intelligence committee: Yes: No: X

Term on intelligence committee expires:

Other committee assignments: Energy and Natural Resources
Finance
Small Business

Major legislative interests: Arms Control
Energy

Key votes: February Vote on Contra Aid--Yes
Cohen-Boren Bill--No

Intelligence interests: Soviet Strategic Programs
Counterintelligence

Visits to CIA facilities: 25X1
 25X1

Last contact with DCI/DDCI: OCA has no record of contact in the
last year

Recent correspondence: None in the last six months

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If you look at the unified budget you can think that by a combination of good economic growth and moderate expenditure restraint you can ooze into budget balance in five years, or if not five, then six or seven. But if you are looking at the budget excluding the Social Security accounts, balance by this route looks discouragingly far off.

THE "POLITICAL QUESTION"

The economics is pretty clear. We can achieve high employment with a unified budget surplus equal to the Social Security surplus. Doing this, as compared with balancing the unified budget, will mean more national saving, more national investment and higher future national income out of which to support the growing number of retired people.

The "political" question is more difficult. The question is not about "politicians" or about "inside the Beltway." It is about us. It is about how we bring ourselves collectively to make decisions for the sake of our collective future. That is a question that applies to a lot more than Social Security. And I don't know how to answer it except by talking about it.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I yield the floor.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Wyoming is recognized.

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.

THE INF TREATY'S
VERIFICATION PROVISIONS

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, in a closed session of the Senate last month we took a detailed look at the capability to and likelihood that the Soviet Union would maintain a covert deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The total unverifiability of such a covert force, combined with strong incentives to cheat, especially in a post-START strategic environment, make that problem a crucial verification concern.

It is not, however, the only verification concern. I would like this morning to review some of the other verification deficiencies of the INF Treaty and offer some suggestions on how the verification regime might be improved.

From a verification standpoint, the Soviet acceptance of the United States zero option position made verification easier than it would be in an agreement that merely placed limits on certain types of weapon systems. Indeed, Soviet acceptance of that position has been used to justify some fairly substantial last minute changes in United States verification positions, such as falling off the requirement for suspect site verification.

The inadequacy of the INF verification regime to monitor numerical limits, as opposed to total elimination, has been recognized by the Intelligence Committee. It laid down a strong marker that the INF Treaty verification procedures would be wholly inadequate to the task of verifying limits of a START agreement.

Mr. President, the zero option, in theory, creates what might be called a "binary situation." Compliance or non-compliance are made clear cut. If a

single SS-20 is seen after the reductions to zero, it is a violation. What concerns me, Mr. President, is that the INF Treaty contains important exceptions to this clear cut, binary situation.

Such exceptions will increase what our intelligence analysts call the "background noise" in the Soviet Union with respect to this treaty. This noise will make it much harder for the United States to render judgments about Soviet activities and might also create compliance problems needlessly, with no easy solutions.

What are the treaty provisions that muddy the waters of the verification picture, denying us clear evidence of violations? First, Mr. President, is the problem with data.

Not only is there a large discrepancy between United States intelligence estimates and Soviet data provided in the treaty, but the data provided up front, last December, is totally meaningless as far as the treaty is concerned because it is not the data that will be used to verify compliance with the treaty; 30 days after the treaty is signed the United States and the Soviet Union will exchange new data for that purpose.

If any changes have occurred in the data from the original memorandum of understanding, the United States will have no right to inspect, via the treaty's agreed procedures, whether the destruction of Soviet missiles and launchers that are no longer in the database were actually eliminated. Moreover, the INF Treaty is silent on the rights of the parties if a discrepancy between the two data exchanges emerges.

Mr. President, administration officials have assured the Senate that large discrepancies would "send a shock wave from Moscow to Washington." This Senator is not confident that after the Senate has given consent to the INF Treaty and it has been ratified by the President, that we would do anything about such a data discrepancy.

We have seen before that the Soviets have falsified data with respect to arms control negotiations in order to maintain a unilateral advantage over the United States; there is no reason to believe that this could not happen again. We have in effect handed them an already signed treaty with a blank for them to fill in whatever numbers they please after ratification.

Second, Mr. President, the INF Treaty allows the Soviet Union to continue production of the first stage of the SS-20 and, due to a drafting error, the second stage as well. Although the SS-20 per se is banned, this allowance for production of missile stages that are similar to the SS-20 will make it virtually impossible to monitor whether these components are being produced and then assembled outside of areas where the United States has inspection rights. In the hearings, one administration official was asked if an

SS-25, which can be produced legally, was seen leaving the production facility at Votkinsk with only two stages whether that would be a violation of the treaty. The answer was no, but again we were assured that it would send a shock wave from Votkinsk to Washington.

Mr. President, shockwaves were sent back to Washington in 1974 when the Soviet Union began flight-testing two new heavy ICBM's contrary to and in circumvention of the United States understanding of the SALT I agreement. Nothing was done then, and I am far less sanguine than administration officials that something would be done today.

Third, Mr. President, the Soviets are allowed to keep intact hundreds of their mobile missile launchers for alleged civilian use. This could make it increasingly difficult to determine if those launchers, when seen, are for military or the civilian purposes the Soviet say they are for. If we were to challenge the Soviets, they could always claim that they were for civilian use.

This problem is further exacerbated by the similarity between the SS-20 launcher and the SS-25 launcher. The quality of our intelligence data would make it extremely difficult to render a firm judgment on this question. Additionally, the Soviets have the right to maintain SS-25 bases which have an infrastructure similar to and compatible with former SS-20 bases.

This will further raise the background noise that the intelligence community must filter through.

Fourth, the Soviets could potentially maintain a force of ground-launched cruise missiles because of the allowances in the treaty for nonarmed cruise missiles.

Remotely piloted vehicles, such as those used for reconnaissance behind enemy lines, could in fact be armed with warheads in time of war. Under the treaty, we have absolutely no inspection rights with regard to these forces.

The INF Treaty does not define what constitutes a different type of cruise missile other than those presently in the Soviet inventory, nor does it establish what criteria will permit us to determine if a cruise missile is unarmed. As a practical matter, it is impossible for us to determine whether Soviet cruise missiles have ranges that fall within the prohibited limits.

As a matter of fact, as we have seen with Iraqi scud missiles, we have no practical means of determining ballistic missiles ranges either.

This points out a problem inherent to the arms control process since its inception. We can count on the Soviet Union stressing to its limits—and beyond—its rights to modernize its forces, in this case, all manner of cruise missiles.

We can also count on the United States unilaterally limiting itself not

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just in the cruise missile area, but in any technology that is similar to cruise missiles, such as remotely piloted vehicles and target drones. I have heard stories of contractors already beginning to pull back on programs that are functionally similar to the cruise missiles limited in the INF Treaty.

Finally, there is the limitation on our ability to conduct onsite inspections. The INF Treaty is heralded as having the most intrusive inspection rights ever negotiated with the Soviets. That is true, especially since we have never had any inspection rights beyond national technical means. The more important question is, "How useful are they?"

First of all, the United States is limited to very few onsite inspections, initially 20, then declining to 15 and later 10. What is more, the United States for practical purposes may not use more than half of those in the Soviet Union. That means that we are really limited to 10, 8, and then 5 inspections per year.

Another more crucial problem is the lack of inspections for suspect sites. Only those sites identified in the memorandum of understanding are subject to inspection. There are facilities that have been identified by the intelligence community as SS-20 facilities that are not on the Soviet list.

Moreover, in the rush to complete the treaty prior to the summit many of the actual procedures for inspection were left vague or simply were not worked out. General Lajoie, the head of the U.S. inspection team, is having to negotiate those details even as we in the Senate head toward a vote on consent to ratification. Right now, today, Mr. President, these details remain to be negotiated. Yet the administration is asking the Senate to proceed.

Mr. President, there is one other aspect of the verification problem that troubles me, and that is the already perfidious effect this agreement has had on the U.S. intelligence community. The first evidence of this, revealed in the closed session, was the DCI's failure to provide a consensus figure on the number of SS-20's produced.

Even more troublesome, I am told, is that there has been an effort to strong-arm members of the intelligence community by high-ranking U.S. officials to change their assessments of the number of treaty-limited items. Reports in the Washington Times indicate that General Perroots was raked over the coals by the Chairman of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense for his agency's position on the number of SS-20's.

If there is indeed an attempt to suborn the intelligence community, it will not be the first time. Senators who were here in 1979 and 1980 will remember well the pressure placed on the intelligence community to revise its estimates of the Soviet threat prior to the SALT II debate.

RECOGNITION OF THE
REPUBLICAN LEADER

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Republican leader is recognized.

BICENTENNIAL MINUTE

APRIL 12, 1945: HARRY TRUMAN LAST PRESIDES
OVER THE SENATE

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, on April 12, 1945, 43 years ago today, Vice President Harry S. Truman sat in the Presiding Officer's chair and performed his functions as President of the Senate for the last time, unaware that President Franklin D. Roosevelt had died that afternoon in Warm Springs, GA.

Harry Truman had spent "the happiest 10 years" of his life in the Senate before he was unexpectedly chosen to run for Vice President with Franklin Roosevelt in 1944. During the first 3 months of his new responsibilities, Truman dutifully presided over Senate debates—as Vice Presidents did routinely in those days. "I enjoyed my new position as Vice President," he reported, "but it took me a while to get used to the fact that I no longer had the voting privileges I had enjoyed for 10 years as a Senator."

That afternoon, while Truman listened to a "windy Senator making a speech on a subject with which he is in no way familiar," he spent his time writing a letter to his mother and sister back in Missouri. When the Senate adjourned, the Vice President sauntered over to the House side of the Capitol to join Speaker Sam Rayburn and other congressional friends in the "board of education" room, as Rayburn called it, for a little bourbon and political talk. But when Truman arrived he received an urgent message. The voice on the phone told him to come directly to the White House. No explanation was given, but Truman sensed the urgency of the request. Darting past his Secret Service agent, Harry Truman ran the length of the Capitol back to his limousine on the Senate side, and raced downtown.

As he entered the White House Eleanor Roosevelt took him aside and told him, "Harry, the President is dead." "Is there anything I can do for you?" he asked. "Is there anything we can do for you?" she replied. "For you are the one in trouble now."

I reserve the remainder of my time. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD. Is morning business closed?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Morning business is closed.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
RESOLUTION FOR 1989

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume consideration of Senate Concurrent Resolution 113, which the clerk will report.

The bill clerk read as follows:

A concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 113) setting forth the congressional budget for the United States Government for the fiscal years 1989, 1990, and 1991.

The Senate resumed consideration of the concurrent resolution.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how much time remains on the resolution?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Forty hours.

Mr. BYRD. Forty hours.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time for the recess today be charged against both sides equally on the resolution.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. DOMENICI. Let the record reflect that I am present and I have no objection.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the record shall so reflect.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator. I suggest the absence of a quorum. I ask the time be charged equally against both sides.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as if in morning business for a period of time of 5 minutes or until the managers of the budget want the floor, but for no longer than 10 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The majority leader.

Mr. BYRD. Would the Senator agree to charge the time that he uses against his side or equally against both sides? It is only 5 or 10 minutes.

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single SS-20 is seen after the reductions to zero, it is a violation. What concerns me, Mr. President, is that the INF Treaty contains important exceptions to this clear cut, binary situation.

Such exceptions will increase what our intelligence analysts call the "background noise" in the Soviet Union with respect to this treaty. This noise will make it much harder for the United States to render judgments about Soviet activities and might also create compliance problems needlessly, with no easy solutions.

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Mr. President, administration officials have assured the Senate that large discrepancies would "send a shock wave from Moscow to Washington." This Senator is not confident that after the Senate has given consent to the INF Treaty and it has been ratified by the President, that we would do anything about such a data discrepancy.

We have seen before that the Soviets have falsified data with respect to arms control negotiations in order to maintain a unilateral advantage over the United States; there is no reason to believe that this could not happen again. We have in effect handed them an already signed treaty with a blank for them to fill in whatever numbers they please after ratification.

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Wyoming - Senior Senator

Malcolm Wallop (R)

Of Big Horn — Elected 1976

Born: Feb. 27, 1933, New York, N.Y.

Education: Yale U., B.A. 1954.

Military Career: Army, 1955-57.

Occupation: Rancher; meatpacking executive.

Family: Wife, French Carter Gamble; four children, one stepchild.

Religion: Episcopalian.

Political Career: Wyo. House, 1969-73; Wyo. Senate, 1973-77; sought Republican nomination for Wyo. governor, 1974.

Capitol Office: 237 Russell Bldg. 20510; 224-6441.



In Washington: After spending much of his career in the shadow of his fast-rising junior colleague from Wyoming, GOP whip Alan K. Simpson, Wallop has emerged in recent years as a sharp-tongued spokesman for the Republican right on foreign policy.

In the 100th Congress, with his party outnumbered and many conservatives feeling defensive even within the Reagan administration, Wallop's aggressive stance seems well-suited to a leadership role among his ideological brethren. If he lacks notable skill in oratory or legislative maneuvering, he has a knack for voicing, with an acid sarcasm, the feelings and frustrations of a sizable group of hard-liners.

Wallop's acerbic stance has not made him one of the more popular members. He is a man who frequently appears edgy and frustrated at Senate life even when it seems to be going well for him. He does not derive much evident satisfaction from the exchange of opposing views; often, he leaves the impression that he believes those who disagree with him are ignorant.

Sometimes, he seems to suggest that his opponents are worse than ignorant. His harsh tone has been most evident toward those who have been on the other side in debates over Central America policy, in which he has been one of Reagan's most militant defenders.

Early in 1987, Wallop told the Senate that consideration of continued aid for the Nicaraguan contra rebels offered a stark choice. To vote to cut off aid, he said, "cannot be interpreted as anything other than a vote in favor of the Sandinista regime. . . . It is a vote for communism in Central America."

Wallop's comment brought an angry retort from Connecticut Republican Lowell P. Weicker Jr., who was outraged by the implication that he supported expansion of Soviet

power. Although he said he was not questioning Weicker's patriotism, Wallop not only refused to withdraw his statement, but expanded it. His opponents, he said, were "meekly" accepting the Soviet "Brezhnev Doctrine," which is said to hold that a country that has adopted communism cannot be allowed to renounce it.

There is an apocalyptic quality to Wallop's foreign policy views. Other conservatives, including Reagan, voice frequent optimism about restoring American supremacy in the world. Wallop seems to portray the spread of totalitarianism as inexorable, and himself as a voice in the wilderness struggling in vain to fight it.

Wallop is well-known in the conservative movement as an early advocate of Reagan's strategic defense initiative missile defense system. Working with a small group of defense scientists, he pushed construction of laser-armed space satellites long before such ideas were taken seriously. Wallop's isolation ended in 1983, when Reagan announced his support for a space defense system.

But Wallop takes a dim view of the direction in which the administration has pushed SDI since then. He argues that Pentagon planners have mistakenly pursued exotic, futuristic weapons instead of what could be put into place within a few years. "The drive for anti-missile defense was hijacked by the Reagan administration's incompetent and unfaithful crew," he said on the fourth anniversary of Reagan's SDI speech.

Wallop and a group of conservative allies favor rapid deployment of a more basic system designed to knock out Soviet missiles before they reach their targets. While acknowledging that the system would not provide the leak-proof "umbrella" sometimes depicted by Reagan, they argue that it would make a Soviet attack too difficult to be attempted.

Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyo.

Despite Wallop's preoccupation with foreign policy, his most significant role in the 99th Congress was in support of another of Reagan's prime initiatives — tax overhaul.

A strong advocate of reductions in individual tax rates, Wallop was skeptical of the tax proposal that emerged from the administration in 1985. By the time Finance markup had begun in the spring of 1986, he was even more doubtful, warning that "none of us are committed to tax reform," and questioning whether it was worth the effort to attack special-interest tax breaks if marginal rates were still to be above the 25 percent level he favored.

When committee Chairman Bob Packwood came up with his last-minute effort to save the bill by dramatically lowering rates, however, Wallop became one of his key allies. More importantly, his backing gave the bill a conservative seal of approval that helped ensure support from others on the right who had been wavering.

Wallop grew disenchanted with the bill as it progressed past Finance. By the conclusion of conference negotiations with the House, he was unhappy enough with the loss of certain business deductions that he voted against it. "I have seen us fritter away the opportunity of a lifetime on the altar of convenience," he complained. But that late criticism did not matter much; the important thing was that he had supported the bill at the crucial time.

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The 1982 election presented a mirror image of Wallop's earlier campaigns for statewide office. He found himself under fire from environmentalists who claimed he had forsaken their cause, and criticized by his Democratic

opponent for being inaccessible to constituents.

The Democrat was former state Sen. Rodger McDaniel, a 10-year state legislator whose path to the Democratic nomination was cleared when Gov. Ed Herschler announced he would seek re-election rather than challenge Wallop.

McDaniel painted the incumbent as a servant of big oil interests and claimed Wallop had "not had one independent thought on the economy since Ronald Reagan's inauguration." But like Wallop in 1974, McDaniel had to be careful not to alienate more conservative members of his own party — some of whom were hesitant to back a man who had been state coordinator for Edward M. Kennedy's 1980 presidential campaign.

Wallop played up his support for the president — he backed Reagan on 71 percent of the votes recorded in 1982 — and promised to work to protect Wyoming water.

McDaniel proved an energetic campaigner and, buoyed by Herschler's strong gubernatorial showing, carried several counties along Wyoming's predominantly Democratic southern tier. But Wallop's \$1 million treasury enabled him to nail down Republican votes in the rest of the GOP-dominated state.

Committees

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Malcolm Wallop (R) 94,725 (57%)
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Malcolm Wallop (R) 61,650 (81%)
Richard Redland Jr. (R) 14,543 (19%)

Previous Winning Percentage: 1976 (55%)

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	Receipts	Receipts from PACs	Expenditures
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Voting Studies

Year	Presidential Support		Party Unity		Conservative Coalition	
	S	O	S	O	S	O
1986	93	5	94	3	95	1
1985	73	14	88	5	83	5
1984	86	4	91	1	94	0
1983	72	22	83	9	82	9
1982	71	18	82	10	86	5
1981	85	9	91	3	93	1

S = Support

O = Opposition

Key Votes

Produce MX missiles (1985)	Y
Weaken gun control laws (1985)	Y
Reject school prayer (1985)	N
Limit textile imports (1985)	N
Amend Constitution to require balanced budget (1986)	Y
Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986)	Y
Block chemical weapons production (1986)	N
Impose sanctions on South Africa (1986)	N

Interest Group Ratings

Year	ADA	ACU	AFL-CIO	CCUS
1986	0	100	0	95
1985	0	95	5	97
1984	5	91	0	76
1983	5	64	13	83
1982	10	74	6	75
1981	10	71	5	100

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ACIS 355/88
18 April 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

SUBJECT: A Synopsis of "The Arms Control Delusion" *
by Senators Malcolm Wallop and Angelo
Codevilla

STAT

1. Action: For your information as requested by

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2. Conclusion: The US must choose between seeking an illusory safety in a continuation of the arms control process or providing for that safety by employing a counterforce offensive capability and anti-missile weapons.

3. Background: It is the authors' view that those Americans who support arms control do so regardless of what it has accomplished, and regardless of what it can realistically be expected to accomplish in the future. The authors believe that the "arms control process" between the US and the Soviet Union is a delusion foisted by some Americans upon other Americans and perhaps on themselves. The book does not deal with Soviet arms control violations except as a peripheral issue.

4. The authors believe that arms control proponents concluded that in the nuclear age, armaments of any kind produce peril, not safety. These arms control proponents pointed to "verification" as the ultimate safety net in arms control and thereby, according to the authors, obscured from themselves, as well as from others, the fundamental question: After detection, what? In the history of arms control, the authors assert, violations have been overlooked, explained away, and have never provoked punishment or retaliation.

5. The arms control process is described as being based both on misinterpretation and on the discounting of Soviet policy. If the Soviets were working to achieve a war-winning capability, it would be literally nonsense or deception for them to enter into a treaty that would deny them that goal. The authors believe that in the current arms control process, the elements of treaties become the things which can be monitored best, not the most threatening things which must be limited:

"...US negotiators define the parameters of arms control agreements less for their military significance than to conform them to the ability of US intelligence to gather information. The only certainty so far as the US government is concerned, is that both military significance and verifiability are less important than the arms control process itself."

6. The authors contrast what the US expected from arms control treaties with what, in their view, we actually got: The US formulated its arms control policy based on the US concept of Mutually Assured Destruction; the USSR based its policy on the war-fighting and war-winning capability of its forces. But arms control failed as a means of constraining the Soviet Union and instead, succeeded as a means of constraining the US.

7. Thus, the authors state that "All of this is to say that in the 1980's after 20 years of the arms control process, the US is left with a radically worsened strategic situation, with an impaired ability to judge military developments at home and abroad, with a near-total reliance on arms control for our safety and independence as well as with a growing realization that Americans have precisely zero means for enforcing the terms of any agreement, good or bad."

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Wyoming - Senior Senator

Malcolm Wallop (R)

Of Big Horn — Elected 1976

Born: Feb. 27, 1933, New York, N.Y.

Education: Yale U., B.A. 1954.

Military Career: Army, 1955-57.

Occupation: Rancher; meatpacking executive.

Family: Wife, French Carter Gamble; four children, one stepchild.

Religion: Episcopalian.

Political Career: Wyo. House, 1969-73; Wyo. Senate,

1973-77; sought Republican nomination for Wyo. governor, 1974.

Capitol Office: 237 Russell Bldg. 20510; 224-6441.



In Washington: After spending much of his career in the shadow of his fast-rising junior colleague from Wyoming, GOP whip Alan K. Simpson, Wallop has emerged in recent years as a sharp-tongued spokesman for the Republican right on foreign policy.

In the 100th Congress, with his party outnumbered and many conservatives feeling defensive even within the Reagan administration, Wallop's aggressive stance seems well-suited to a leadership role among his ideological brethren. If he lacks notable skill in oratory or legislative maneuvering, he has a knack for voicing, with an acid sarcasm, the feelings and frustrations of a sizable group of hard-liners.

Wallop's acerbic stance has not made him one of the more popular members. He is a man who frequently appears edgy and frustrated at Senate life even when it seems to be going well for him. He does not derive much evident satisfaction from the exchange of opposing views; often, he leaves the impression that he believes those who disagree with him are ignorant.

Sometimes, he seems to suggest that his opponents are worse than ignorant. His harsh tone has been most evident toward those who have been on the other side in debates over Central America policy, in which he has been one of Reagan's most militant defenders.

Early in 1987, Wallop told the Senate that consideration of continued aid for the Nicaraguan contra rebels offered a stark choice. To vote to cut off aid, he said, "cannot be interpreted as anything other than a vote in favor of the Sandinista regime. . . . It is a vote for communism in Central America."

Wallop's comment brought an angry retort from Connecticut Republican Lowell P. Weicker Jr., who was outraged by the implication that he supported expansion of Soviet

power. Although he said he was not questioning Weicker's patriotism, Wallop not only refused to withdraw his statement, but expanded it. His opponents, he said, were "meekly" accepting the Soviet "Brezhnev Doctrine," which is said to hold that a country that has adopted communism cannot be allowed to renounce it.

There is an apocalyptic quality to Wallop's foreign policy views. Other conservatives, including Reagan, voice frequent optimism about restoring American supremacy in the world. Wallop seems to portray the spread of totalitarianism as inexorable, and himself as a voice in the wilderness struggling in vain to fight it.

Wallop is well-known in the conservative movement as an early advocate of Reagan's strategic defense initiative missile defense system. Working with a small group of defense scientists, he pushed construction of laser-armed space satellites long before such ideas were taken seriously. Wallop's isolation ended in 1983, when Reagan announced his support for a space defense system.

But Wallop takes a dim view of the direction in which the administration has pushed SDI since then. He argues that Pentagon planners have mistakenly pursued exotic, futuristic weapons instead of what could be put into place within a few years. "The drive for anti-missile defense was hijacked by the Reagan administration's incompetent and unfaithful crew," he said on the fourth anniversary of Reagan's SDI speech.

Wallop and a group of conservative allies favor rapid deployment of a more basic system designed to knock out Soviet missiles before they reach their targets. While acknowledging that the system would not provide the leak-proof "umbrella" sometimes depicted by Reagan, they argue that it would make a Soviet attack too difficult to be attempted.

Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyo.

Despite Wallop's preoccupation with foreign policy, his most significant role in the 99th Congress was in support of another of Reagan's prime initiatives — tax overhaul.

A strong advocate of reductions in individual tax rates, Wallop was skeptical of the tax proposal that emerged from the administration in 1985. By the time Finance markup had begun in the spring of 1986, he was even more doubtful, warning that "none of us are committed to tax reform," and questioning whether it was worth the effort to attack special-interest tax breaks if marginal rates were still to be above the 25 percent level he favored.

When committee Chairman Bob Packwood came up with his last-minute effort to save the bill by dramatically lowering rates, however, Wallop became one of his key allies. More importantly, his backing gave the bill a conservative seal of approval that helped ensure support from others on the right who had been wavering.

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Malcolm Wallop



R-Wyoming
Reelection Year: 1988
Began Service: 1977
SR-237 Russell Senate
Office Building
Washington, DC
20510-5001

(202) 224-6441

BIOGRAPHICAL

Born: 2/27/33
Home: Big Horn
Educ.: B.A., Yale U.
Prof.: Rancher
Rel.: Episcopalian

KEY STAFF AIDES

Name	Position	Legislative Responsibility
William U. Hill	Admin. Asst.	
Byra A. Kite (307-634-0626)	State Rep.	
Janis Budge	Press Secy.	
Pam Foy	Office Mgr.	
Lynn Munroe	Legis. Dir.	Energy Committee (Oil, Natural Gas, Coal, Alternatives)
Jodi E. Brayton	Legis. Asst.	Public Lands, Indian Affairs, Fish and Wildlife, Endangered Species, Water
Michael J. Chakarun	Legis. Asst.	Finance Committee (Taxes, Trade)
Jack D. Crouch II	Legis. Asst.	Defense, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence
Michael Hoon	Legis. Asst.	Labor Committee; Government Affairs, Budget, Nuclear Energy, Environment and Public Works
Bonnie S. Cannon	Legis. Aide	Small Business, Judiciary; Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Marian Jacob	Legis. Aide	Veterans, Post Office, Commerce
Kristi Wallin	Legis. Aide	Agriculture
Gayle E. Pitts	Pers. Secy.	
Kathi Wise	Appts. Secy.	

COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS

Committee	Subcommittee(s)
Energy and Natural Resources	Public Lands, National Parks and Forests, <i>Ranking Minority Member</i> • Mineral Resources Development and Production • Water and Power
Finance	Energy and Agricultural Taxation, <i>Ranking Minority Member</i> • International Trade • Taxation and Debt Management
Small Business	Competition and Antitrust Enforcement, <i>Ranking Minority Member</i> • Export Expansion

OTHER POSITIONS

Senate Republican Committee on Committees • Senate Coal Caucus • Western State Coalition
• Senate Arms Control Observer Group • Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
• Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan

STATE OFFICES

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2009 Federal Center, Cheyenne, WY 82001 (307) 634-0626
2515 Foothill Blvd., Rock Springs, WY 82901 (307) 382-5127
40 So. Main St., Sheridan, WY 82801 (307) 672-6456
P.O. Box 1014 (Post Office Bldg.), Lander, WY 82520 (307) 332-2293

Angelo Codevilla

Mr. Codevilla was Senator Wallop's designee to the Staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence for eight years--from about 1976 to 1984. He left that position and went to the Hoover Institution at Stanford where he currently is working. For a brief period (about 90 days) in 1980-81, Mr. Codevilla served on President-elect Reagan's Executive Branch transition team.

Mr. Codevilla has written extensively on national security issues including arms control. He has another book in work now, entitled, "Peace and War." It is intended to be a college text.